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0019-7939/00/6204 $01.00 489 490 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW associated with high-quality jobs, defined as jobs with low dismissal rates, opportunities for participation and discretion, and limited perform ance m onitoring. We focus on call centers because they are a setting where we m ight expect institutions to have weak effects on m anagem ent strategy. The newness and mobility of call centers, the ease with which calls can be shifted between locations, and the growing prevalence of outsourcing have m ade it difficult for unions to organize these workplaces (Shire, Holtgrewe, and Kerst 2002; Holst 2008) . However, call centers are also often based in industries with a strong union presence, such as telecommunications, and they have been the focus of both recent union organizing efforts and labor-manage m ent partnerships on work reorganization (Doellgast 2008; Taylor and Bain 2001) . They thus provide a good setting for exam ining how differences in bargaining arrangem ents within and across countries affectjob quality in new workplaces under strong pressures to cut costs and rationalize work. The analysis is based on survey data from five coordinated m arket econom ies in con tinental Europe with strong labor laws and bargaining rights, extensive bargaining cover age, and industry-level bargaining structures (A ustria, D enm ark, France, G erm any, an d Sweden) and three liberal m arket economies with weak labor laws and bargaining rights, low bargaining coverage, and fragm ented bargaining structures (the United States, the U nited Kingdom, and C anada). First, we ask w hether m easures of job quality vary system atically between countries associated with liberal and coordinated models of capitalism. Second, we analyze the relationship between workplace-level collective bargaining institu tions andjob quality. Here, we compare union effects in liberal m arket econom ies with both works council and union effects in coordi nated m arket economies-in other words, we exam ine the effects of bargaining structure rather than just union presence. Third, we ask w hether these institutional effects differ between in-house and outsourced call cen ters. Outsourcing is a com m on strategy used to segm ent call center work or to pursue a m ore cost-focused strategy, as it allows firms to avoid collective agreem ents or existing com m itm ents to the work force (Walsh and Deery 2006 ); thus we m ight expect these workplaces to be the most likely place for convergence on low-quality jobs. Findings draw on data from the Global Call Center Project (Holman, Batt, and Holtgrewe 2007) , which consists of identical establishment-level surveys of 1,734 call centers in the countries investigated here.
Previous Research
Job quality is typically viewed as consisting of extrinsic or economic outcomes, including high pay andjob security (Kalleberg, Reskin, and Hudson 2000; McGovern, Smeaton, and Hill 2004) , and outcomes that provide m ore intrinsic or indirect benefits, including par ticipation in decision-making, discretion over tasks, and an absence of detailed m onitoring and surveillance (Valverde, Ryan, and Gorjup 2007; Tilly 1997; Green 2005) . Comparative researchers have argued that these m easures of job quality are not simply a function of firm-level differences in strategy, technology, or hum an capital, but also are influenced by political and econom ic institutions outside the firm. Studies in the 1980s and 1990s showed that m anufacturing firms in liberal m arket economies, such as the U nited States and U nited Kingdom, were m ore likely to pursue Taylorist models of work organiza tion associated with high turnover, narrowly designed jobs, and intensive m onitoring, while similar firms in European coordinated m arket econom ies such as Germany and Sweden invested in worker skills and adopted practices em phasizing internal flexibility (Lorenz 1992; Berggren 1992; Streeck 1984; T urner 1991; Wever 1995) .
While there is broad consensus today that "national institutions m atter" for job quality, researchers continue to debate exactly how they matter, or the m echanisms through which these institutions influence m anage m ent decisions. O ne group of theories associated with the comparative capitalism literature emphasizes the em beddedness of employer strategies in com plem entary insti tutions at the national level. Em ploym ent practices that rely on high skills and worker autonom y are viewed as one outcom e of national business systems or varieties of capi talism, which encourage employers to adopt long-term investm ent and m arket strategies (Hall and Soskice 2001; Whitley 1999) . In contrast, political or power-based argum ents advanced by industrial relations theorists hold that collective bargaining institutions play a central and unique role in outcomes, as they distribute bargaining power between different actors in the workplace and in society. High job quality in the coordinated m arket econom ies of "social E urope" is thus explained by these countries' traditions of strong labor unions, which have used exten sive negotiating rights and high bargaining coverage to redistribute productivity gains to workers (Turner 1991) .
These two perspectives differ in the role each attributes to collective bargaining as a central governance m echanism and ex planation for cross-national variation in job quality. This distinction has becom e more meaningful in current debates concerning institutional change and liberalization in Eu rope (Streeck and Thelen 2005) . Studies of work reorganization in the 1980s and 1990s were based primarily on m atched case studies in export-oriented sectors that were em bed ded in national systems of com plem entary institutions and that had high bargaining coverage and union density. Today, collective bargaining arrangem ents are becom ing in creasingly heterogeneous within and between countries (Katz and Darbishire 2000) , and may be viewed as a m ore im m ediate obstacle to widening m anagem ent prerogative than other coordinating institutions, such as inter-firm relations (H oepner 2007) . The reach and organization of collective bargain ing is likely to be m ore uneven in service workplaces, which tend to be newer and smaller than m anufacturing establishments and which typically have lower union density and employ groups with low union affinity, such as m inorities and students (Dolvik and W addington 2004) . U nder these conditions, are firms in coordinated m arket econom ies m ore likely than those in liberal m arket econom ies to adopt em ploym ent practices associated with high-quality jobs, regardless of industry segm ent or collective representa tion? O r are "good jo bs" primarily a feature of core workplaces in these countries with strong unions and works councils-in other words, is workplace-level collective bargaining a necessary condition for the positive worker outcomes traditionally associated with the social European model?
We contribute to these debates by com par ing the effects of both national and collective bargaining institutions on em ploym ent prac tices in call centers-workplaces that have been a focus of recent efforts to restructure and segm ent custom er service and sales in a variety of industries. In the following sections, we develop hypotheses based on the comparative capitalisms literature and power-based theories from the industrial relations literature.
National institutions and job quality. Com parative capitalism scholars view national economies as consisting of distinct configura tions of institutions that generate or support a particular "logic" of action (Jackson and Deeg 2006:6) . The varieties of capitalism ap proach, associated with the work of Hall and Soskice (2001) , distinguishes between two groups of national economies, based on the forms of coordination used to solve transac tion cost problems. In coordinated m arket econom ies, bank-based finance provides "patient capital" for long-term investments, stakeholder corporate governance systems support cooperative labor relations, and organized vocational training provides high industry-or firm-specific skills. Together, these institutions should support qualityfocused strategies: firms have incentives to make long-term com m itm ents to employees and disincentives to exit from these com m it ments. In liberal m arket economies, the m arket plays a m ore central coordinating role in all of these areas, encouraging m ore unilateral m anagem ent approaches and com petitive strategies associated with cost-based com petition and high external flexibility.
O ther comparative capitalism theorists view institutions as the result of nationally specific historical trajectories. According to this view, distinct national patterns of production m ethods and vocational training differentiate coordinated economies (Mau rice, Sellier, and Silvestre 1986), and varied labor law and union organization patterns differentiate liberal economies (Colvin 2006; Godard 2002) . For example, U.K. legislation on working time and employm ent protection is increasingly influenced by EU social direc tives, which impose employer constraints not present in the U nited States.
Taken together, these theories predict that em ploym ent practices associated with high-quality jobs will differ across countries, but disagree on the extent of convergence between countries characterized by m ore liberal or coordinated institutions. We m ight expect a greater degree of convergence in service firms, as they tend to focus on national or local markets, are less likely than m anu facturing firms to be covered by traditional vocational training and collective bargaining institutions, and are typically under strong pressures to reduce direct labor costs, given limited substitutability by capital. However, there is some evidence of cross-national variation in service m anagem ent practices. For example, Finegold et al. (2000) found that Germ an hotels adopted m ore job rota tion and had lower employee turnover than hotels in the U nited Kingdom and U nited States, while Shire et al. (2002) and Doellgast (2008) found that Germ an call centers designed jobs m ore broadly and m onitored employees less intensively than call centers in the U nited Kingdom and U nited States.
This suggests that we can expect varia tion in the quality of call center jobs at the national level, but that there should be some systematic differences in outcomes between countries associated with coordinated and liberal m arket models. Thus:
Hypothesis 1: Call centers in coordinated market economies will have lower rates of dismissal, greater use of high-involvement work practices, and lower perform ance m onitoring than those in the United States, while call centers in other liberal market economies will have practices similar to those in the United States.
Collective bargaining institutions and job quality. Political or power-based argum ents advanced by industrial relations scholars hold that collective negotiations at the firm and workplace level are a central m echa nism through which national institutions influence em ploym ent practices. This sug gests two modifications to "national effects" argum ents. First, workplaces with collective bargaining institutions should have different outcomes from workplaces without those institutions. Second, worker representatives in coordinated and liberal m arket economies should have different resources for influenc ing the three m easures of job quality we ex am ine here-dismissals, work organization, and perform ance m onitoring.
In European coordinated m arket econo mies, the structure (notjust the presence) of collective bargaining influences bargaining power. A key feature of industrial relations in these countries is the system of co-determ ina tion or consultation through works councils. Labor unions' prim ary responsibility has traditionally been to negotiate industry-level agreem ents on pay and working time with em ployers associations, while em ployee-elected works councils negotiate firm-and establish ment-level agreem ents on such practices as the introduction of perform ance-based pay, the introduction and evaluation of teams, and the use of m onitoring technologies. The com bination of these workplace-and industry-level bargaining structures was be lieved to create "productive constraints" that foreclosed strategies to com pete on the basis of low wages and high external flexibility in countries like Germany (Streeck 1991) . In recent years, these boundaries have becom e increasingly blurred: negotiations over pay and working time have been decentralized to the establishm ent level across Europe due to the expansion of firm-level agreem ents and decline in bargaining coverage (Katz and Darbishire 2000) , and works councils' ties with unions have weakened in many industries and countries. As a result, workplaces are increasingly covered by different com bina tions of union and works council agreements.
Each level of in terest represen tation should, in turn, have distinct effects on job quality measures. U nion agreem ents are often viewed as being encom passing within coordinated m arket econom ies or at least as having substantial spill-over effects on other firms. Thus, unions may have only weak effects on dismissals, as job security is enhanced by national em ploym ent protec tion legislation. There is also little reason to expect union agreem ents to influence work design or perform ance m onitoring, as unions typically do not have central respon sibility for negotiating over these practices. In contrast, works councils may have a m ore direct effect on all measures of job quality, because they are typically responsible for ne gotiating agreem ents on such issues as work redesign and often play a role in approving or contesting hire and fire decisions.
These bodies thus have different bargain ing roles and rights that may influence out comes. However, the configuration of union and works council agreem ents should make the most crucial difference for bargaining power. Close relationships between unions and works councils have been viewed as im portant in encouraging unions to develop independent expertise to influence the con struction of "best practices" at the firm level (Belanger, Giles, and Murray 2002) . Works councils often rely on unions to provide le gal and organizational resources, as well as to help coordinate the bargaining agenda across establishments in a firm and industry to foreclose com petition for investm ent on the basis of wages and working conditions (Thelen 1991) . This suggests that in coordi nated m arket economies, collective bargain ing should encourage the use of practices associated with good jobs; and, further, these effects should be strongest in establishments with both a union agreem ent and a works council. Doellgast (2008) found evidence of this stronger "dual representation" effect on em ploym ent practices in Germ an call centers, which we expect to hold across the coordinated countries. Thus:
Hypothesis 2: In coordinated market economies, call centers with both a union and a works council agreement will have lower dismissal rates, greater use of high-involvement work practices, and lower perform ance monitoring than centers with no collective bargaining institutions.
Unions in liberal m arket econom ies rely on firm-or establishment-level bargaining structures and have m ore direct contact with workers through a shop steward and grievance system. They negotiate overpay, benefits, job security provisions, and due process, but they do not have form al rights to negotiate over the design of work and com pensation. Thus, unions have primarily been able to influence extrinsic aspects of job quality, such as job security. U nion presence has been found to be negatively associated with dismissals in both the U nited States and the United Kingdom (Shaw et al. 1998:198; Cully et al. 1999) , which is often attributed to strong and institutionalized grievance procedures that provide a m echanism for challenging arbitrary decisions by managers.
In contrast, union presence in liberal mar ket econom ies has been found to have either no effect or a negative effect on em ploym ent practices associated with intrinsic aspects of job quality, such as teamwork, work discretion, and m onitoring (Wood 1996) . Most studies from the U nited States show that workers in unionized workplaces are less satisfied than non-union workers with job content, supervi sion, and prom otion opportunities. Ham m er andAvgar (2005:243-44) summarized three possible explanations for these findings: first, unpleasant jobs are m ore likely than other jobs to attract unionization; second, m anage m ent may increase production demands after unionization to com pensate for higher labor costs; and third, unions may negotiate narrow job classifications and restrictive work rules that make it m ore difficult to im plem ent high-involvement practices. In comparative perspective, these outcomes may be attrib uted to the narrow scope of bargaining rights in liberal m arket countries.
This suggests that collective bargaining will be associated with extrinsic rather than intrinsic job quality outcomes in liberal mar ket economies:
Hypothesis 3: In liberal market economies, call centers with union agreements will have lower dismissal rates than those with no collective bargaining institutions. However, the work orga nization and perform ance monitoring practices adopted by unionized establishments will not significantly differ from those adopted by the other establishments.
Outsourcing and job quality. Institutional effects also may vary across industry seg m ents that differ with respect to inherited bargaining structures, level of exposure to price-based com petition, and degree of em beddedness in national systems of corporate governance and training. Subcontracting status, or w hether firms handle calls in-house or subcontract this work to third-party provid ers, is one im portant factor distinguishing call center industry segments. Outsourced suppliers are newer, m ore volatile firms that are less likely to be covered by collective bargaining agreem ents (Holman, Batt, and Holtgrewe 2007) .
Three characteristics of this business seg m ent encourage the degradation ofjob qual ity and present distinct challenges to worker representatives seeking to improve workers' jobs. First, outsourced firms are often under substantial pressure to cut costs. Although a variety of factors affect the decision to outsource, studies have found that labor cost savings are often a central motivation (Har rison and Kelley 1993) . By subcontracting out work, organizations can take advantage of lower wage rates without violating internal equity standards (Abraham 1990) . Second, subcontractors' clients have an interest in closely m onitoring subcontractors' work force and often require the outsourced sup plier to m eet strict perform ance standards (Walsh and Deery 2006; Schonauer 2008) . This can contribute to work intensification, m ore rigid job descriptions, and less control over the timing and m ethods of work. Third, outsourcing maybe used to check the growth of unions and to weaken the bargaining power of workers by moving operations outside the coverage of collective agreem ents and "escaping" traditional legal and negotiated constraints on the em ploym ent relationship (Pfeffer and Baron 1988; Doellgast and Greer 2007; M arginson, Sisson, and Arrowsmith 2003) .
For these reasons, outsourcers are typi cally assumed to create lower-quality jobs than similar in-house firms. This view has been supported by several studies of service workplaces. Grugulis, Vincent, and Hebson (2003) showed that subcontracting increased m onitoring and decreased discretion across job functions with different levels of complex ity. Batt, Doellgast, and Kwon (2006) found that outsourced call centers in the U nited States used m ore electronic m onitoring and had lower pay and discretion than similar in house centers. In an employee-level study, Walsh and Deery (2006) showed that the work force of a call center subcontractor for an Australian airline had lower pay, less job security, and a less developed internal labor m arket than its in-house work force.
These conditions in turn present m ultiple challenges to unions and other worker rep resentatives. U nion organizing is likely to require high efforts for uncertain rewardsleading to the paradox that those groups of workers with poor jo b quality who have the greatest need for unions are least likely to have access to them (Sydow 1997) . O utsourced call centers typically have weaker collective bargaining institutions, and have proven m ore difficult to organize in both liberal and coordinated m arket economies. In Austria, the Netherlands, and France, sectoral col lective agreem ents have been negotiated for subcontractors, although with weak terms and conditions, while elsewhere, only a m inority of these workplaces are covered by firm-level agreem ents.
Thus, we expect that outsourced call centers will be less likely to adopt employ m ent practices associated with high-quality jobs in both coordinated and liberal m arket economies:
Hypothesis 4: Outsourced call centers will have higher dismissal rates, more limited use of highinvolvement work practices, and higher perfor mance monitoring than in-house centers.
In addition, we expect that both national and collective bargaining institutions will have either weaker or no effects on job quality in outsourced call centers, due to the relative newness of this sector and its possible use by com panies to escape existing institutional constraints.
Methods

Sample
The sample is drawn from establishmentlevel surveys of call center m anagers con ducted in eight countries: Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Sweden, C anada, the U nited Kingdom, and the U nited States.
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Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, and Sweden are all coordinated m arket econo mies (CMEs) in northern and central Europe with high bargaining coverage, a tradition of industry-level bargaining between employer and union confederations, and a com plem en tary system of works councils. Works coun cils in Germany and Austria have extensive co-determ ination rights over working time, paym ent m ethods, health and safety, and the introduction and use of equipm ent for m onitoring employees. In Denmark, works councils do not have legally protected co determ ination rights, but they play a similarly independent role in representing employee interests and negotiating over em ploym ent policies and practices (j0rgensen 2003). In France, works councils have weaker co determ ination rights, but typically play an im portant consultation role, particularly with regard to financial and restructuring topics; and in Sweden, strong legal inform ation, consultation, and co-determination rights are exercised primarily by labor unions with the support of works councils. As the character istics of collective bargaining in France and Sweden are distinct from those in the other countries, we ran separate analyses excluding them. However, the key results with respect to bargaining structure effects were similar; thus, we include these countries for purposes of extending the scope and generalizability of findings.
In contrast, Canada, the U nited Kingdom, and the U nited States are all liberal m arket economies (LMEs) with low bargaining cover age and primarily firm-or establishment-level bargaining agreem ents (Godard 2002:251) . W here unions are present, they represent employees through collective bargaining on pay, em ploym ent security, and seniority rights and through a shop steward system that enforces contract provisions. However, they have no form al rights to negotiate over work redesign, the introduction of new technol ogy, or the design of com pensation. While works councils are present in the United Kingdom and have been strengthened by a series of EU directives, they primarily play a weak consultation role (Hall and Terry 2004) .
These surveys were based on a com m on tem plate and conducted by separate coun try teams as part of the eighteen-country Global Call Center Project. Samples were drawn from m em bership lists of employers associations and industry associations in most countries, due to the lack of official national statistics on call centers. The final sample included 1,734 establishments from the eight countries, but this num ber was reduced in the regressions to 1,441 (dismissals), 1,624 (high-involvement work organization), and 1,622 (perform ance m anagem ent), due to missing data.1 Further inform ation on sur vey procedures and response rates for each country survey is provided in the introduc tion to this symposium (Batt, Holm an, and Holtgrewe).
Measures
Dependent variables. O ur dependent vari ables include three measures of em ploym ent practices associated with job quality: the level of dismissals, high-involvement work organization, and perform ance m onitoring. The dismissal rate measures the percentage of the core work force that was dismissed in the previous year. For the multivariate analyses, we used the square root of dismissals, which produced a m ore norm al distribution of the outcom e variable than a log transform ation.
The high-involvement work organization scale includes measures assessing the degree to which work is designed to take advantage of employee skills and employee participation in decision-making. It includes the percentage of core employees in self-managed teams, in offline teams, with fl exible job descriptions, and with access to flexible working arrange ments. It also includes average employee discretion, m easured using six items: the level of employee discretion over the daily work tasks employees perform ; the tools, m ethods, or procedures they use; the pace or speed at which they work; what they say to the customer; their lunch and break schedule; and handling additional custom er requests, m easured on a five-point Likert scale. !Means and standard deviations for all variables at the country level are provided in A ppendix E in the introduction to this special issue (Batt, H olm an, and Holtgrewe).
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Performance monitoring employs eight-point scales, with values ranging from "never" to "daily," to m easure three variables-how often employees are given statistics on per form ance, how often they are given general feedback on perform ance, and how often supervisors listen to calls-and a five-point Likert scale to measure the extent to which perform ance inform ation was used to disci pline employees. The work organization scale (C ronbach's alpha = 0.54) and perform ance m onitoring scale (C ronbach's alpha = 0.64) were constructed by taking the average of standardized z-scores for each variable. We selected the variables in each scale based on categories derived from theory and past research, rather than by attem pting to isolate an underlying com m on factor . Thus, we do not assume that the practices are highly correlated with one another, but rather that when they are im plem ented to gether they likely signal a work environm ent that provides opportunities for participation and discretion.
We chose to analyze job quality in term s of three different outcomes rather than as one aggregated scale for several reasons. First, past research has found that managers often adopt seem ingly contradictory practices aim ed at simultaneously prom oting com m itm ent and cutting costs. For example, higher task discretion is often com bined with work intensification and poor job security (Appelbaum and Batt 1994). These mixed or "hybrid" models may be particularly com m on in service organizations, which face the potentially conflicting goals of being both custom er-oriented and cost-efficient (Korczynski 2002). Second, unions and works councils have different bargaining rights and form s of bargaining leverage over different kinds of m anagem ent decisions. Thus, by analyzing them separately, we are able to distinguish between outcomes with stronger or weaker institutional effects.
Independent variables. We created five indi cator variables to measure different collective bargaining arrangem ents in CMEs and LMEs. These were coded as 1 or 0 for the following categories: workplaces in coordinated market econom ies (a) with both a union agreem ent and a works council, (b) with a works coun cil but no union agreem ent, and (c) with a union agreem ent but no works council; (d) workplaces in liberal m arket econom ies with a union agreem ent; and (e) workplaces in all countries with no collective bargaining. National setting is based on country indica tors. Subcontracting status is m easured as an indicator variable, coded 1 if the call center is operated as an in-house firm and 0 if it is a subcontractor.
Control variables.
We control for differences in hum an capital, job type, industry, and organizational characteristics that may affect the em ploym ent practices firms adopt. An alternative explanation for why some coun tries and workplaces have higher jo b quality than others may be that firms in those settings enjoy a m ore educated pool of workers, or have adopted a production m odel that relies on higher overall skill levels. These factors may influence expected returns to invest m ents from practices emphasizing worker discretion or participation and thereby affect em ployers' incentives to reduce transaction costs through, for example, internal labor markets or job security arrangem ents (Becker 1964) . We include three variables for aver age ed u catio n al level of the w ork force-(a) schooling through age 18, (b) schooling through university, and (c) (the reference category) schooling through age 16 or no education-and one variable m easuring the num ber of weeks it takes an average worker to becom e proficient in the job.
Past research has found that sales-focused service interactions are associated with greater individualization of work and au tonomy as well as higher employee burnout and turnover (Batt 1999) . Thus, we control for centers in which the majority of calls are outbound. We also control for w hether the center primarily serves large business custom ers, as service com panies may adopt practices associated with high job quality for employ ees servicing m arket segments that prom ise high returns (Blutner, Brose, and Holtgrewe 2000) . Two controls for industry segm enttelecom m unications and banking-account for possible differences due to the history of strong regulation in both sectors. Finally, we include controls for organization size (total employment) and age (num ber of years since the center's establishm ent).
We experim ented with a num ber of ad ditional control variables in prelim inary analyses, including other industry sectors, w hether calls were predom inantly salesfocused, whether the center served a national or international market, w hether the center was part of a larger organization, and initial and ongoing training. However, as these did not add substantially to the explanatory power of the model, we om itted them from the final analysis.
Results
Collective bargaining structure. Table 1 shows the percentage of establishments with differ ent collective bargaining arrangem ents in the in-house and outsourced segments of each country. Representation was m ore extensive in the CMEs, where the majority of call cen ters and agents had collective agreements. However, there were striking differences between countries in each group. Bargaining coverage was greatest in Austria, France, and Sweden-all countries in which the state or employers associations have secured some form of m andatory extension of collective agreements. Sweden is unique in having 100% coverage of firms, although in France a very high percentage of the work force in surveyed call centers (94%) is covered by a collective agreem ent. O utsourced centers in Denm ark and Germany had m uch m ore lim ited representation than in-house workplaces, with less than half as many establishments and workers covered by agreem ents. Again, this may be due to the lack of m andatory exten sion mechanisms, as the gap is narrower in Austria and France, while in Sweden the cov erage of agents in in-house and outsourced operations is uniformly high. In addition, a higher proportion of subcontractors in these countries are covered by works council agree ments alone, while in-house centers are more likely to have dual bargaining arrangem ents.
In two of the three LMEs, call centers were poorly represented-only 12% of the work force in Canada and 16% in the United States had union agreem ents-but in the U nited Kingdom, almost half of the establishments and 71% of the work force were covered by an agreem ent, similar to rates for Denm ark and Germany. Moreover, whereas Canada and the U nited States had negligible union presence in outsourced centers, the United Kingdom had higher coverage than Denmark and Germany, with 62% of agents covered by a union agreem ent.
Determinants of job quality. Multivariate analysis enables us to test the relationship between the different collective bargaining arrangem ents and jo b quality m easures. Table 2 shows the means, standard deviations, and correlations for all variables. The shares of observations by country are as follows: Austria, 5%; Denmark, 6%; France, 12%; Germany, 9%; Sweden, 8%; Canada, 22%; the U nited Kingdom, 10%; and the United States, 28%.
Correlation results provide prelim inary evidence that national setting, collective bargaining institutions, and subcontracting status are associated with variation in job quality. The presence of both a union and a works council in CMEs was correlated with all three measures of high-quality jobslower dismissal rates, a greater incidence of high-involvement work practices, and lower perform ance m onitoring-while other col lective bargaining arrangem ents showed m ore mixed results. In contrast, the presence of a union in the LMEs was only associated with lower dismissal rates. Outsourcing was correlated with higher dismissal rates and greater m onitoring in the full sample.
The multivariate results for the relation ships between our independent variables and the three m easures of job quality are presented in Tables 3-5 . In each table, Model 1 shows the results of hierarchical regressions that test the effects of national setting (Hy pothesis 1); Model 2 adds variables measuring collective bargaining arrangem ents in CMEs (Hypothesis 2) and LMEs (Hypothesis 3); Model 3 includes variables for subcontracting status (Hypothesis 4); and Model 4 presents the full m odel with hum an capital controls. We then perform separate regressions on the outsourced call centers, to exam ine w hether collective bargaining and national institu- bBased on the total reported num ber of full-time and part-tim e agents, including tem porary workers. CU.K. call centers in our sample also had works councils; however, we do not include them here, as our com parison focuses on equivalent form s of collective bargaining between "coordinated m arket" and "liberal m arket" countries.
tions are associated with job quality measures in these workplaces. The reference group for collective bargaining effects is centers with no bargaining; and the reference for country effects is the U nited States. We use left-censored Tobit analysis for dismissal rates, because turnover truncated at 0 (Maddala 1992), and we use OLS regression for work practices and perform ance m onitoring. Table 3 provides inform ation on the factors affecting dismissal rates. First, pat terns at the national level do not show clear differences between CMEs and LMEs. The U nited States had significantly higher dismissal rates than all other countries. A comparison of coefficients dem onstrates that while Canada had higher dismissal rates than Austria, France, and Germany, the U nited Kingdom 's dismissal rates were not different from those in most CMEs (with the exception of A ustria), and Denm ark had significantly higher dismissal rates than Austria, France, and Germany. Thus, the U nited Kingdom and Denm ark appear to be outliers in their respective groups. Second, collective bar gaining influenced outcomes in each group of countries: significantly lower dismissals were associated with the jo in t presence of a union and a works council in the CMEs and with the presence of a union in LMEs. Lower dismissal rates were also recorded in in-house call centers; and including subcontracting status in the m odel dim inished the size, but not the significance, of the LME union effect (Model 3). In outsourced centers, country effects were similar, with the exception of Sweden, where dismissal rates in outsourced centers were similar to or higher than rates in the LMEs, and Denmark, where they were similar to rates in the other CMEs. However, we find a different pattern of bargaining ef fects: in CMEs, both the com bined presence of a union and a works council and the pres ence of a union alone were associated with reduced dismissals, while union presence had no effect in LMEs. Table 4 exam ines variables associated with the adoption of high-involvement work practices. Again, there was some difference between CMEs and LMEs, but this did not hold for all countries. Call centers in Austria, Germany, and Sweden reported a significantly higher incidence of these practices than did the LMEs; however, France and Denm ark .83*** -aChange in x2in M odel 1 is based on the addition of country variables to a m odel with organizational controls only. * Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level (two-tailed tests).
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had rates of adoption similar to those of the LMEs. Collective bargaining effects again differ: the jo in t presence of a union and a works council in CMEs was associated with a greater use of high-involvement practices, but no effects are found for the lone presence of either a union or a works council in CMEs, or for union presence in LMEs. Finally, in-house centers did not use m ore of these practices, and including subcontracting status did not significantly change the R-square (Model 3). The analysis of the outsourced sample shows some differences in institutional effects. In Sweden, rates of adoption were similar to those in the LMEs; and in CMEs, use of these practices was higher in centers with a union agreem ent only, but not in those with just a works council or dual bargaining.
The third m easure of job quality was per form ancem onitoring (Table 5 ). M onitoring was significantly lower am ong call centers in all CMEs and the U nited Kingdom than in the United States and Canada. However, U.K. centers also had significantly higher rates of m onitoring than all of the CMEs, with the exception of France, which also had higher m onitoring rates than the other CMEs. Both the U nited Kingdom and France are thus outliers in their respective groups. Again, the com bined presence of a union and a works council agreem ent in CMEs was associated with lower rates of perform ance m onitoring, while union representation in the LMEs had no effect. However, in CMEs, the presence of a works council alone also reduced m oni toring rates, while union presence alone had no effect. In-house centers used less per form ance m onitoring, and the inclusion of subcontracting status significantly increased the R-square value and reduced the size and statistical significance of collective bargain ing effects (Model 3). In the sample of outsourced centers, institutional effects were similar, although France is not significantly different from the U nited States or United Kingdom and the jo in t presence of a union and works council agreem ent in CMEs was not associated with reduced m onitoring.
Across the three outcom e measures, the addition of both country indicators (Model 1) and collective bargaining indicators (Model 2) significantly increased the Chi-square for dismissals and R-square for the other outcomes, suggesting that each set of institu- tional variables contributed meaningfully to im provedjob quality; the size and significance of change in explained variance, however, were m ore substantial for the country indi cators. A num ber of the control variables were also statistically significant. The hum an capital variables were strongly associated with higher job quality across outcomes and increased the variance explained for both dismissals and high-involvement practices (Model 4). The addition of hum an capital controls did not decrease the significance of collective bargaining or country effects on job quality measures, with one exception: the difference in dismissal rates between Denm ark and the U nited States declined in significance when D enm ark's higher hum an capital measure was accounted for. Taken together, these findings suggest that differ ences in outcomes between workplaces with different collective bargaining arrangem ents or in different countries are poorly explained by variation in education and training levelsalthough the variables used here may also not .64*** -aChange in R2in Model 1 is based on the addition of country variables to a m odel with organizational controls only. *Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level (two-tailed tests). fully capture this variation. H um an capital measures also had either no association or a weak association withjob quality outcomes in the outsourced sample. The organizational variables associated with higher job quality varied somewhat across outcom e measures; however, overall, smaller, older, in-bound centers appear to have offered "better jobs."
Discussion
This study dem onstrates that differences in job quality across call center workplaces can be partially explained by national setting, collective bargaining arrangem ents, and whether call centers are subcontractors or operated in-house. However, these effects vary across the three outcomes m easured here: dismissal rate, high-involvement work practices, and perform ance m onitoring. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, call centers in CMEs were m ore likely to adopt em ploym ent practices associated with high job quality than were those in the U nited States, while call centers in the other LMEs were m ore similar to those in the U nited States. However, there were anomalies within each group. Denmark had higher dismissal rates than several CMEs, while both Canada and the U nited Kingdom had lower dismissal rates than the United States. Call centers in Denm ark and France showed more limited use of high-involvement work practices, similar to the LMEs. Perfor m ance m onitoring was higher in France than in the other CMEs and lower in the United Kingdom than in the other LMEs.
Some of this variation may be due to established institutional differences at the national level. For example, Denm ark is known for its unique "flexicurity" model, characterized by weaker em ploym ent protec tions, high levels of unem ploym ent insur ance, and active labor m arket policies, while both Canada and the U nited Kingdom have stronger em ploym ent protection laws than the U nited States. French industry is also known for relying on a narrow er division of labor and for having a weaker tradition of direct worker participation in m anagem ent decision-making than Germany or Sweden (see, for exam ple, Goyer 2006; Maurice, Sellier, and Silvestre 1986). O ther differ- Collective bargaining arrangem ents within each group of countries also had different effects across the three outcom e variables, providing partial support for Hypotheses 2 and 3. The jo in t presence of a union and a works council agreem ent in CMEs was as- sociated with lower dismissal rates, greater use of high-involvement work practices, and lower perform ance m onitoring, while in LMEs union presence only affected dismissal rates. Thus, consistent with past research, our findings suggest that strong bargaining rights exercised through dual representation in CMEs may encourage higher levels of par ticipation and discretion (Turner 1991) and also may make it m ore difficult for employers to dismiss employees, possibly by providing additional mechanisms to challenge hire and fire decisions. In LMEs, unions play a more central role in providing protections from dismissals but do not have the bargaining rights or power to influence work design.
We also found some variation in the ef fects of different bargaining structures in the CMEs. Most notably, call centers with a works council alone adopted less intensive perfor mance m onitoring but showed no difference in terms of dismissals or work practices, while union presence alone was not associated with any of the outcom e measures. This is prob ably explained by the strong ability of works councils in most European CMEs to block invasive and frequent perform ance m onitor ing, based on their legal rights and traditional bargaining role, as well as the im portance this issue holds for workers (Doellgast 2008:312) . Work design, in contrast, is not typically a m andatory subject of bargaining, and thus may require unions to provide expertise, to exercise additional countervailing power, and to play a coordinating role in negotiations. Certain issues in work design, such as teams and flexible working time, have been strongly backed by European unions and continue to shape their political agenda in the workplace.
A third set of findings concerns the effects of outsourcing on jo b quality and collective bargaining. O utsourced firms had higher dismissal rates and m ore intensive perfor m ance m onitoring, providing partial confir m ation of Hypothesis 4; however, they were not less likely to use high-involvement work practices. This presents a potentially contra dictory picture, as we m ight have expected some trade-off between the two: employers that use m ore intensive m onitoring should in turn be less likely to invest in practices that require greater employee involvement and skill. O ur findings suggest that the two outcomes may instead be driven by differ ent organizational or strategic factors. It is likely that a higher level of m onitoring is dem anded by an outsourcer's clients who are interested in greater transparency of perform ance results, but that these employers still experim ent with team work and flexible working arrangem ents to boost motivation and perform ance. In addition, inclusion of outsourced status in the models dim inished the size of union and works council effects on dismissals and the size and significance of dual representation effects and union ef fects in LMEs on perform ance m anagem ent. This suggests that some of the variation in outcom es across call centers with different bargaining arrangem ents can be explained by the larger proportion of in-house centers that are covered by these arrangem ents.
We also were interested in exam ining w hether the relationships between institu tional context and job quality found in the full dataset held for the subsample of subcon tractors, as one justification for outsourcing maybe to avoid the constraints of institutions such as strong union agreem ents or training obligations. First, the findings show a similar pattern of variation across countries, with generally higher job quality in the CMEs than the LMEs. There is thus no straightforward evidence of cross-national convergence in subcontractors' em ploym ent practices, de spite their overall higher dismissal rates and more intense use of perform ance monitoring.
Second, collective bargaining was also associated with some variation in outcomes in outsourced call centers, although here findings differed markedly from those in the full dataset. Both dual bargaining and a union agreem ent alone in CMEs predicted dismissals, while a union agreem ent in LMEs had no effect. This may be due to weaker com pliance with em ploym ent protection rules in this sector, and thus the need for unions to enforce the rules in outsourced workplaces in CMEs. In contrast, unions in LMEs may have achieved weaker job security provisions in subcontractors than in in-house firms. A particularly interesting finding is the strong negative association between works council presence in CMEs and perform ance m onitoring. This suggests that m onitoring is one key area in which works councils are able to use bargaining rights to influence outcomes in subcontractors, despite often being newer and less experienced. Thus, while a smaller proportion of subcontractors was covered by collective bargaining, where bargaining was present in CMEs it appears to have m ade some contribution to higher jo b quality. However, the strongest m anifes tations of bargaining's influence appear to have been reduced dismissals and curtailed surveillance rather than participation in higher-qualityjob design.
The results should be viewed in the light of limitations in the data. First, samples were constructed and surveys adm inistered differently across countries (see Batt et al., in this symposium) . This may m ean that some cross-national differences are due to the unique characteristics of the centers sur veyed. We have tried to address this potential problem by including a com prehensive set of controls in our models, but this may not account for other sources of sampling varia tion. Second, questions concerning employ m ent practices may not capture differences in design and im plem entation. The history and interpretation of self-managed teams and flexible working arrangem ents differ across countries, and form al practices may be im plem ented differently in union and non-union workplaces. Further analysis using m atched pair case studies would provide in sights into variation in substantive outcomes and the mechanisms through which collective bargaining influences m anagem ent practices in different national settings.
Conclusions
Unions have traditionally been am ong the most visible organizations working to improve job quality in industrialized countries. Indus trial relations scholars have argued that their success is linked to national labor laws and bargaining rights, which give them resources to build countervailing power in negotiations and thus to incorporate stakeholder interests in firm s' investm ent and m anagem ent deci sions (Turner 1991) . Comparative capitalism theories have treated collective bargaining as one elem ent of national business systems or varieties of capitalism, and argued that distinct em ployer strategies in European coordinated market economies are associated with greater investments in employees (Hall and Soskice 2001) .
T he findings presented here provide evidence that the configuration of national institutions in European coordinated mar ket econom ies provides incentives and constraints that can encourage managers to adopt practices associated with higher-quality jobs, even in m ore poorly regulated call center workplaces. However, the strength and presence of collective bargaining ap pear to play an im portant role within these countries in improving worker discretion and participation, despite increasing variation in bargaining structures at the workplace level. O utsourced call centers provide a lower cost and potentially a m ore flexible option for organizing jobs, but do not represent a comprehensive escape from regulation. At the same time, outsourcing to some extent assists m anagem ent prerogative in both co ordinated and liberal m arket economies, in the sense that both the presence of collective bargaining and its influence are more limited in these workplaces.
These findings have im portant implica tions for how governm ents and other col lective actors approach the expansion of service work. They suggest that a "high road" is possible, but may require the active m aintenance of employment protections and bargaining rights. For unions, the news on these expanding workplaces is not uniformly good. Although unions appear to retain some influence in line with established insti tutional opportunities and constraints, they would be ill-advised to rely on the stability of these frameworks. Extending their influence into m ore cost-and market-driven industry segments will require considerable creativity in adapting traditional forms of bargaining leverage to new challenges.
